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Abstract: Through a personal narrative account, this paper explores the nature of the author’s
cognitive dissonance experienced during a traverse of a high-altitude ski mountaineering objective
(Nevado Ishinca 5530 m) in Peru’s Cordillera Blanca. The author experienced psychological discomfort
in the ascent and a role of self in determining a continued commitment with the ski mountaineering
challenge. Distraction, trivialization, act rationalization and finally attitude change were all used
in attempt to reduce negative levels of cognitive dissonance. The lack of consonant cognitions to
support abandoning the climb, the notion of free choice, the role of self-concept and self-esteem values
motivated continued commitment until the negative levels of arousal subsided. Through a challenging
mountaineering experience, I developed a greater self-awareness of the role of commitment to an
objective which could be applied to other life events and experiences.
Keywords: cognitive dissonance; strategies of dissonance reduction; characteristics of
dissonance arousal and modes of reduction; consonant cognitions; attitude and behaviour
change; autophenomenology
1. Introduction
High motivation, commitment and effort are required to achieve a mountaineering objective [1–6].
However, investigation into the process of continued engagement with, and maintenance of
commitment to, a mountaineering objective is less widely investigated. In analysis of mountaineering
autobiographies, the role of cognitive dissonance is considered in the construction of self and
retrospective self-justifications for actions or decisions made whilst climbing mountains. Cognitive
dissonance is experienced by a person when they have internal mental inconsistency of beliefs, values,
goals or knowledge about the world [7]. As a result of the inconsistent nature of two or more pieces of
related knowledge a person holds, individuals suffer from a form of mental discomfort or negative
arousal. However, it is not clear how and why this is the case [7]. In order to rectify mental discomfort
experienced as a result knowledge inconsistency, a person is motivated to make changes [7] to either
justify a set of thoughts or actions or avoid situations that increase levels of discomfort. Broadly
changes are therefore either attitudinal [8,9] or behavioural. In some previous studies the level of
dissonance experienced is claimed to determine whether an attitude or behaviour change is likely [9].
However, it is difficult to consider mental and behavioural changes as separate or distinct as they are
inextricably linked and form part of one another within a person. In addition, complex motivational
and emotional traits influence decision making in the process of dissonance reduction suggesting it is
not just a case of attitudinal or behavioural change [10].
Whilst most studies agree that the motivation for dissonance reduction is directly proportional to
the level of discomfort experienced [11], ‘no research has unambiguously demonstrated the direction of
this motivation—whether it is approach or avoidance orientated’ ([12], p. 1) Therefore, an action-based
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model of dissonance was proposed [13] ‘perceptions and cognitions can serve as action tendencies’
and decisions are made according to an approach-related process, so that thoughts are brought in
line with goal-directed behaviours ([13], p. 36). However paradoxically, effective action can be
interrupted by inconsistent cognitions, suggesting that sometimes thoughts cannot be brought into
line with goal-directed behaviours [13]. In addition, the action-based model [14] is aligned to work on
behavioural commitment [15], suggesting that people are approach-motivated to behave congruently
(in actions and mindset) to a given commitment or goal and that this then reduces levels of dissonance.
However, this does assume all people, in all contexts, would desire a reduction in dissonance.
The motivation to think or act differently may persist to reduce the levels discomfort associated
with cognitive dissonance but the strategy of change is also important in understanding the process.
There are several possible mental and behavioural approaches or strategies (in action or mindset) that
could be used to reduce cognitive dissonance. Two reviews of other studies on dissonance [10,11]
determine the types of strategies that may be adopted in cognitive dissonance reduction. These
cognitive dissonance reducing strategies can be seen in the model in Figure 1.
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Res arch in dissonance reducing str t sed on a titude change [8,9] and behaviour
change [16,17], but neither considers the use t ies [11]. In a d tion, the simple strategies
of distraction or forgetting [18] may be r ffi i t t attitude change [ 1], and trivializing the
dissona t cognition though increasin salie t al es r self-affirmation [19] may reduce disso ant
cognitions. However, if responsibility is needed for dissonance to develop [11], then a denial of
responsibility [20] can be more effective than trivialization for reducing negative sensations. From
a behaviour perspective, rationalizing inconsistent behaviour by adding consonant cognitions that
support continued behaviour [21,22], or choosing action that is closer to the aspiring behaviour in a form
of act rationalization [15], can reduce dissonance. However, the choice of strategy to reduce dissonance
is difficult to predict [23], and there are limited studies into the state of emotional dissonance as
opposed to the process of reduction and the role of attitude importance and trivialization [10,11,14,17,24].
Therefore, more contextually based study is required.
Based on other studies [11], some characteristics of dissonance arousal and the mode of reduction
proposed may help to predict and analyse the process of dissonance reduction. Firstly, the magnitude of
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experienced dissonance is important in determining the nature of the mental or behavioural response,
as well as secondly whether the dissonant inducting scenario it is freely chosen or requires compliance
and finally the associated effort involved for completion [7,10,24]. In addition, the availability of
a possible mode of dissonance reduction [11], and secondly the likelihood of success in achieving
dissonance reduction [7], are factors affecting people’s choice of strategy. But none of the studies
explain how individuals determine the effort required for dissonance reduction nor the chance of
success. The effort required [7,9] can also limit possible change in attitude [8,9] or behaviour [16,17].
If the current behaviour is satisfying [7] then habits formed over a long period of time can be resistant
to change [25]. ‘Studies have yet to compare how these paradigms potentially differ in (a) the level of
dissonance magnitude aroused and (b) the selection of dissonance reduction modes’ [11:11], hence
the need for further contextual studies. In addition, the impact of the affective emotional state of the
individual [26] and whether it is a reoccurring level of discomfort [27] and the nature of the context [23]
in which dissonance occurs, may influence the adoption of a mode of reduction [11].
2. Background
In 2018, following two winters living and skiing in the French Alps, I decided to travel to and
complete a ski mountaineering expedition to the Cordillera Blanca, Peru with one climbing partner.
The Cordillera Blanca is the most western part of the Peruvian Andes, north of the Peruvian Capital
Lima. One of our ski mountaineering objectives was Nevado Ishinca (5530 m). Climbing Ishinca
involves a day’s trek to its respective base camp. We used an Arriero (a person who transports goods
using animals) and his two donkeys to carry our equipment to the basecamp. After at least a day
of rest and a reconnaissance along the start of the route, an early start of 01:00 for Nevado Ishnica
was required. A traverse of Ishinca was completed in 13 h. During the initial part of the ascent,
I experienced periods of cognitive dissonance in starting and continuing with the climb. It is this initial
commitment to the objective which is of interest as opposed to whether the summit was achieved. The
strategies of dissonance reduction adopted along with the nature of dissonance arousal and modes of
reduction are explored in this study.
3. Methodology
This broadly phenomenological [28] study uses autobiographical memory [29] to construct
narratives (presented as vignettes) to explore a personal experience of cognitive dissonance and
associated strategies of reduction in a specific ski mountaineering context. Not surprisingly,
autobiographical memories have previously been used in analysis of high-altitude mountaineering
studies or other outdoor activities to analyse actions and decision making, relationships with risk and
other related psychological, social or environmental elements [1,5,6,30–34]. However, many of these
examples involve analyses of others, as opposed to personal, experiences. Whilst readers may make
some inherent comparison with other mountaineering stories, primarily I do not aim to situate personal
experiences ethnographically within a culture of mountaineers. Instead these ‘recollections of specific,
personal events’ ([35], p. 17) and the associated cognitive dissonance experienced are used by those
that they pertain to in meaning making and construction of self [36], to understand acceptance of, and
commitment to, experiences as they unfold. The context of a ski mountaineering experience stands as
a metaphor for challenging life events and the successful completion of the objective is not important
in the study. Hence, the research is autophenomenographical [37] in that it studies the phenomena of
cognitive dissonance and associated strategies of reduction of the author as first participant rather
than a cultural place or group, but with the added benefit of an understanding of cultural norms. It ‘is
the study of the lived experience from the unique position of the individual that is engaged in the
experience’ ([37], p. 3).
Two important phenomenological properties of autobiographical memory are ‘the sense of
recollection and the belief that autobiographical memories are accurate’, both of which are heightened
the more vivid the visual imagery in the remembered event ([38], pp. 79–80). There is high visual
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imagery in these autobiographical memories which also refer to specific places, times and events.
However, they are also constructed within a discourse of other memories of similar events and life
experiences, so memory boundaries and content are fluid. Whilst these autobiographical memories are
long term, accessed from mental stores of information, they still involve significant assigned emotional
and personal importance [35,39]. Emotions can change over time, through personal reflection [40],
they can still exhibit stability over longer amounts of time [41] and this gives value for personal
learning. In addition, as actor, agent and author [36], there are benefits of being able to see and feel the
event as well as try to make sense of it that is not possible from the study of biographical accounts [42].
‘Our stories are left incomplete if we omit the metaphoric and symbolic codes we use in narrating our
subjective and personal realities’ ([43], p. 498). But this also means I am both a storyteller and a story
analyst concurrently, as the narrative is constructed, the sequence and consequence offering an insight
into my experiences [44] of cognitive dissonance in a specific ski mountaineering event. Informed
consent was gained from my climbing partner to include their presence in my autobiographical
memories. I used dissonance reduction strategies, characteristics of dissonance arousal and mode of
reduction [11] as a framework for analysis.
4. Narrative Findings and Discussion
The negative psychological discomfort associated with cognitive dissonance [1], involves feelings
of unease or tension [7,8,20]. However, there are few studies exploring the nature of dissonance
arousal [1] or the characteristics of reduction [11]. In my ski mountaineering ascent of Ishinca (5530 m),
I experienced a period of increasing cognitive dissonance before it abruptly dispersed. The greatest
emotional discomfort was experienced in the first hour of the ascent after leaving the camp. However,
prior to this the nature and magnitude of cognitive dissonance built as I prepared mentally and
physically for the day ahead [7,10,24]:
I wake to hear other climbers passing the tent. It is about midnight. They are reasonably quiet, but
my sleep is light and disturbed due to the knowledge that I must get up soon. My mind is already
disturbed. Our alarm is set for 1am. I hate these early starts. I do not know if I hate them because it is
early, and I must leave a warm sleeping bag to venture outside, or if I hate the uncertainty of what
comes next. It is as if starting is the greatest problem.
‘Fear of the unknown’ is defined as ‘an individual’s propensity to experience fear caused by the
perceived absence of information at any level of consciousness or point of processing’ ([45], p. 39).
Intolerance of that uncertainty [46] can create cognitive, emotional and behavioural reaction, suggesting
that cognitive dissonance could also be created by a lack of one set of information as opposed to
inconsistency between sets of information [7]. However, the first hour of the climb had been completed
the previous day, as a reconnaissance to a lunch spot, before returning to camp. Therefore, the first
part of the ascent was ‘known’, even if the rest of the climb was not, further complicating analysis.
A reaction to the cognitive dissonance might be to avoid the situation or ruminate [45], with a focus on
both in this context. My attitude was focused around the uncertainty of what came next, the physical
discomfort of lack of sleep, the context of an early start and venturing into the cold; attempting to
accumulate cognitive reasons that would be consonant with not starting the climb [21,22,47]. Yet these
consonant cognitions [21,22] were not salient enough in that moment to warrant abandoning the climb
or even to voice concerns with my climbing partner.
My attitude was negative [10], which is a personal habit of recurring dissonance [25] in relation to
mountain climbing objectives. Throughout all aspects of my life, I have regularly chosen to initiate
new challenging objectives, but paradoxically I find committing to the actual start of some difficult
to achieve. At the beginning of this ski mountaineering objective my level of cognitive dissonance
was present but relatively low in magnitude [11], perhaps because I felt I was still able to make a
choice about whether to commit [47]. I struggle with decision making in general, always wanting to
keep options open or stop and think about it, and this manifests as greater cognitive dissonance in
Sports 2019, 7, 249 5 of 11
the mountaineering context given the requirement for immediacy of decisions. Within the simplicity
of mountaineering context, the available choice of behaviour is often very limited—try to ascend or
retreat, even if the nature of completing those actions is more complex. Paradoxically, therefore the
limited choice of associated behaviour or available actions could create some greater levels of cognitive
dissonance in my case, given my desire for lots of options. Yet the simplicity and adversity created
by the mountaineering context does allow the opportunity to challenge self and transition through
periods of cognitive dissonance which is often touted as a benefit for personal development and mental
restoration [48]. Although, mental restoration had to wait as my cognitions were focused on mountain
preparation in a somewhat anxious manner:
I want to sleep as I need the rest before the huge physical effort but it is limited in this situation as
my mind is busy with checking and changing what has already been decided and considering every
eventuality – have I packed the right equipment, what clothes will be best to wear, what will the ascent
be like? I wonder how I was going to manage the ascent with ski boots on my feet and skis on my
back. I think about the risk of falling somewhere on the climb, which has always been my main source
of concern.
The dissonant condition is greater when real-life consequences exist to counter attitudinal
behaviour [49]. In that sense the behaviour of carrying on with the climb is potentially counter
attitudinal to a sense of survival and gives specific focus for further rumination [45] about risk levels,
equipment and clothing. However, in the reconnaissance to a lunch spot the day before, I did not
experience any environments in which I might fall, so this contextual thought could be trivialized [19].
I also had some confidence from having met others at the base camp and on the mountain—so it
felt safer in terms of support or possible rescue. In order to consider whether the level of route was
compatible with my ability there was opportunity to examine the appearance and discourse of others’
competence and compare it to my own [50] which proved favourable. So, whilst there were consonant
cognitions [21,22] for not starting the climb, the magnitude of each was kept low and hence there was
likelihood of successful motivating action [7]. I still had no salient nor valued consonant cognitions to
provide me with reason to stop climbing, despite trying to find them, as further illuminated by the
following narrative:
I slowly and methodically get dressed. Once outside the tent I discover it was not too cold. [The
temperature did not get very cold till just before dawn when you were on the brink of wondering
if you could cope with it and then the sun came up.] My climbing partner already had the stove
going—hissing its way towards boiling water for tea and rehydrating breakfast cereals. I consider
refusing to go—but I have no reason. I am angry with myself which makes matters worse. I drink and
eat in thoughtful silence and busy myself by putting the final equipment in my rucksack. We are off.
My behaviour now mirrors my attitude to getting up and getting started in a slow procrastinating
manner. I did not want to start the effort and was worried about potential risk I might encounter but
none of these were salient enough justifications (consonant cognitions) for avoiding the climb [21,22]
so any counter attitude was trivialized [19]. Deciding not to climb is the ‘easier’ physical choice, yet I
do not make this easier choice, contrasting with the theory that the attitude [8,9] or behaviour adopted
would be the one involving least effort to reduce dissonance [7]. Given my previous mountaineering
experiences I had some tolerance to levels of cognitive dissonance [7] built through successful habits [25]
of perseverance and resilience in these contexts. I knew I just needed to start. Therefore, I did not
change behaviour [16,17] to match the attitude of not having to climb but aligned it to a more salient
value, despite it giving me increased emotional discomfort [10]. The salient value for me is to persevere
and the importance of this attitude [24] is great in the mountaineering context [2] but also secondly to
reduce any negative emotional effects of not climbing.
I have implicit belief that whilst I do not want to start the climb, that any other behaviour would
cause disappointment, regret and paradoxically resultant negative dissonance. Dissonance usually
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emerges when individuals perceive that they are free to engage in or refuse the counter-attitudinal
behaviour and feel responsible for the negative consequences of their behaviour [10]. In this sense the
decision to ascend is one of free will giving a counter attitudinal behaviour to the one requiring least
effort. Having a high level of choice means attitudes are more likely to be consistent with behaviour [12].
Therefore, I avoided the potential negative dissonance by not climbing through taking responsibility for
myself and my actions, indicating both a level of self-awareness and perhaps self-accountability in
behaviour and attitudinal response [9]. In this sense my cognitions and behaviour are compatible, yet
the mental tension remains which seems to oppose the traditional thinking on cognitive dissonance [7]
or imply that there is greater complexity in the number and magnitude of inconsistent cognitions and
behaviours occurring in this context. The nature of the number and salient value of these inconsistent
cognitions (involving conflict with self) and behaviour increased the levels of cognitive discomfort as
the following narrative illustrates:
The first hour was hard. I struggled to commit to and accept the objective, the action, the involvement.
I knew it was about an hour to the place where we had had lunch the day before. This felt like a
significant point in my mind, but I do not know why. I knew I had to just keep going to this place
– literally one foot in front of the other. My head banged with the desire to stop, but not because I
was finding it particularly hard work physically. I also did not really try to stop the thoughts but
somewhat wallowed in the self-pity, and the perceived pain. I felt like an angry teenager, who could
not explain or understand this sense of self. I was frustrated by my own thoughts and behaviour. But
I could at least move my body forward at a consistent and even pace, although my head throbbed with
negative black thoughts. I am not sure if my thoughts affected the nature of my pace, but I just wanted
to get to that lunch spot.
It has been suggested that the magnitude of dissonance is related to the number of discrepant
cognitions and the degree of importance of the cognitive elements [7,11,24]. Therefore, I was
experiencing multiple inconsistent cognitions, they were of high importance, or both elements
contributed to heightened negative arousal. This was our first ski mountaineering objective in Peru,
which was less challenging in terms of height and difficulty of access and climb than other planned
objectives. Yet I did not relish the easier challenge and perhaps put more cognitive pressure on myself
to complete it successfully in order to boost self-affirmation [19]. In this sense the decision to ascend or
retreat was further complicated by the resultant sense of self I would experience. It is therefore not
just about committing to and accepting the objective but also about accepting self. As the level of
emotional discomfort was so high, the magnitude of attitude change required was comparable [10]
and so acted as a barrier to reducing the dissonance.
I attempted to strategically distract myself [18] and reduce the emotional discomfort associated
with high levels of cognitive dissonance, through a form of ‘act rationalization’ [15]. I supported
the conduct of physically moving, in order to create the most likely continued behaviour once past
the lunch spot. I may have chosen action because similar actions have been successful in the past–a
recurring habit which successfully reduced cognitive dissonance as a positive force, as opposed to a
habit which is resistance to attitude change [25]. I find moving the body is something I can do when
my mind is turbulent, especially if the action is simple and methodical. It is almost a release from the
cognitive dissonance. It is meditative and calming. The repetition gives my body something to do, it
occupies it, so I have space and time to think. I know I find swimming, running and walking all helpful
in this manner. In addition, I acknowledge that the physical act was not as difficult as the mental act or
attitude alignment. In that sense, the physical behaviour of starting the climb required the least effort
so the counter attitudinal behaviour was not that negative after all [49]. Yet I experienced cognitive
dissonance of extremely high magnitude at the time and theoretically responded by trying to reduce
dissonance [10]. However, I experienced continued, if not increased dissonance, contrasting with
dissonance theory [7], or showing a greater complexity to the process. It seemed that was sensed by
my climbing partner:
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Maybe my climbing partner sensed my emotional discomfort, as he asked if I was ok. I did not need
or want his questions and that made matters worse! I could not stop the thoughts or put them to
rest (although I did not particularly try any mindful techniques or meditative exercises). It made
me irritated that he thought I was not ok, although I did not actually know if this was what he was
thinking. His questions made me think he questioned my strength, my ability to manage and achieve
the goal. Did I question these things about myself? I tried to explain the struggle to him and the need
to just keep going for now.
Sometimes I consider mountaineering objectives to be the ambition of other climbers more than
mine, perceiving a lack of free choice [47] and thereby inhibiting attitude alignment with behaviour. In
addition, if I perceive a partners’ ease with the objective, as I struggle with my inconsistent cognitions,
the greater my emotional discomfort, ‘your gain is my pain’ [50]. If I perceive I am subjected to some
climbing partners’ assessment and critique, my emotional discomfort is further increased. And whilst I
am struggling with my inconsistent cognitions, if I perceive their disappointment with me, in addition
to my own, then my negative arousal escalates. Prosocial behaviour is correlated with comfort [49]
and the increased social turmoil, even if it was just perceived by myself, contributed further to the
magnitude of my cognitive dissonance, into feelings of anger, frustration and resentment.
However, anger and frustration can lead to increases in effort [26] which had a positive motivating
effect in changing my attitude in this context [10]. Dissonance and motivation occur in the same brain
zone and could explain the connection [12]. In this context, the cognitive dissonance contributed
to an increased sense of stimulated alertness with a sense of associated increased energy which
was paradoxically focused initially on further negative arousal rather than action. In addition, the
heightened emotions and sense of arousal is a learned habit [25], making the goal physically and
emotionally more rewarding if the cognitive dissonance is extreme and overcome. The high level of
negative arousal in both personal and social aspects when combined with resilient action and the
reaching of the previous lunch spot location led to a ‘bursting’ of tensions:
Once we were at the lunch stop from the day before the pain, anger and struggle strangely subsided,
it disappeared suddenly. The dark crushing thoughts lifted spontaneously. I could now accept the
challenge and started the ascent properly. Why did I have to go through this process of resistance
of fighting with myself? What a waste of energy. Why was the first part the climb the hardest to
achieve or was it passing this known line that I had to do to start for real? I had to keep going until I
surrendered to the moment. I did not resist the task at this point, I accepted it.
Whilst self-concept or self-esteem may moderate dissonance processes, they may not cause
dissonance [13]. Yet my sense of self was clearer, more motivated and self-esteem enhanced once I
had arrived and passed the lunch spot, implying that whilst I had made the decision to physically
move, I had not made the decision to emotionally commit to the climb until that point. ‘Once the
individual decides on a course of action or makes a behavioural commitment, it enhances the value
of the chosen course of action and reduces the value of the rejected course of action’ ([51], p. 36).
Therefore, in contrast to some research [13] my attitude had to align to behaviour more than behaviour
aligning to attitude, in order to create abrupt conflict resolution [52]. Viewing the course of action in
a more positive manner will help the individual align action more effectively [51], which occurred
here. The free choice paradigm in combination with act rationalization [15] processes emerged in a
quick and almost automatic manner in this context [49]. However, I find it hard to explain why the
lunch spot was key to the change in attitude and commitment to the climb, other than perhaps being
the ‘true’ start to the unknown elements of the climb and any uncertainty induced fear [45]. The ski
mountaineering objective did not start till we had moved beyond this location and it was where the
negative arousal dispersed. Therefore, I would also argue that the nature of commitment and any
associated action are fluid and not as simplistic as theoretical models [7,51] would suggest.
The original cognitive dissonance model [7] did not explain why cognitive discrepancy caused
a negative emotive state [51] and the negative state I experienced was not easily explained by two
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opposing or contrasting cognitions. I experienced multiple inconsistent cognitions and attitudes to the
knowledge, as well as behavioural actions at one time giving complexity to the cognitive dissonance.
Like this context, individuals rarely just have just two inconsistent cognitions at one time, and it is more
complex pattern than the original dissonance model [7] envisages. But what is interesting is the abrupt
nature of attitude change I experienced and perhaps the energising force that was redirected from
negative attitude to positive behaviour [10]. This implies the mountain environment can generate a
context for life-affirming events that are congruent with personal change, resultant positive self-image
and health.
Finally, the original cognitive dissonance theory [7] implies that behaviour and attitude are
separate and can be changed independently from one another. Whilst my attitude to climbing did
eventually become congruent with my behaviour and values, the notion that attitudes can be inferred
from behaviour as consistent with self-perception theory [46] is too simplistic to explain my experiences
in this context. Attitude is continually shifting according to context and so the importance of an attitude
is only relevant at that one time and probably explains why the results of studying post dissonance
attitudes have been contradictory [24]. Any attitude or behavioural change [16,17] as a result of
reducing cognitive dissonance are dependent on the availability of new information (e.g., change
in mountain weather, difficulty of the climb, or physical tiredness of the participant in this context)
and the attitude salience [24]. Although post event analysis has enabled a greater self-awareness and
understanding of my salient attitudes, the exact relationship between attitude and behaviour to reduce
cognitive dissonance remains difficult to separate out and ascertain.
5. Conclusions
In the expedition to make a ski mountaineering traverse of Ishinca (5530 m) I experienced a range
of cognitive dissonance reducing strategies: distraction [18], trivialization [19], act rationalization [15],
and finally attitude change [8,9]. However, there was less behaviour change. My behaviour appeared
more learned, stable and constant [38] than my attitude. Therefore, in contrast to some findings [13]
attitudinal change aligned to behaviour. The lack of consonant cognitions [21,22] for abandoning the
climb meant that negative cognitive arousal increased as the climb started. Yet even in the simplicity of
the mountain environment, there was more than two inconsistent cognitions, so it is difficult to assess
how attitudes and behaviour change as a result of one specific conflict. Attitudes are multidimensional
and have affective, cognitive and behavioural dimensions [10].
In terms of the characteristics of dissonance, arousal, and modes of reduction, a variety of outcomes
were experienced and explored. Firstly, the magnitude of dissonance arousal experienced during the
ascent increased to a high point before abruptly disappearing altogether [49]. It is difficult to ascertain
whether the negative arousal experienced was habitual, as a form of recurring dissonance, or to what
extent the final attitude change played a part in the ultimate successes on the mountain. Could I have
continued to climb with the same level of negative arousal? Affective state, through feelings of anger
and frustration, was found to have a motivating role [26,49,52], although paradoxically the energy
focused on negative arousal would have been more beneficial if it was directed at completing the climb
itself. Reflection on previous experience (as a result of a recurring dissonance) allowed the author to
use and build habitual behavioural strategies [25] which whilst offering some distraction paradoxically
increased the levels of negative cognitive arousal experienced. My behaviour aligned to the salient
values of tolerance and perseverance increasing the likelihood of a successful outcome. Thereby
removing negative arousal associated with abandoning the climb and allowing self-affirmation [19].
However, less experienced mountaineers or individuals in similar dissonant contexts may not be able
to draw upon reflective, stable and rational behaviour approaches [15] that operate in a contradictory
manner to cognitions.
Whilst the notion of free choice in whether to climb had a role in attitude response, the contextual
experiences alluded to a real complexity in how choice is perceived and acted upon. Attitudes,
behaviours, social background, and values all affect how we see freedom of choice that is specific to
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contextual elements and the individual involved. So, it is difficult to ascertain the exact role of free choice
in dissonance arousal or reduction in this case. However, the reduced decision-making choices or lack of
available options that come from the simplicity experienced in a mountain context allows for individuals
to reflect, examine and develop greater self-awareness to use in related experiences. Although in
my case, the lack of available options might cause greater emotional discomfort. Paradoxically, the
behaviour chosen was not the one requiring least effort, which further magnified cognitive dissonance.
This suggests that neither attitude nor behaviour simply changes to reduce negative cognitive arousal.
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